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REVEALING CHOICE BRACKETING
ANDREW ELLIS AND DAVID J. FREEMAN
Abstract. In a decision problem comprised of multiple intermediate choices, subjects may
fail to take into account the interdependencies between their choices. We design and deploy
a novel experiment to understand how people make decisions in such problems. We provide
revealed preference tests of three models of choice bracketing: broad, narrow, and partial-
narrow. We apply these tests in three experiments to determine how subjects bracket in
portfolio allocation under risk, social allocation, and induced-utility shopping experiments.
40-44% of our subjects are consistent with narrow bracketing, while only 0-15% are consistent
with broad bracketing. Classifying subjects while adjusting for models’ predictive precision,
75% of subjects are best described by narrow bracketing, 14% by broad bracketing, and 3%
by intermediate cases.
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that agents broadly bracket their choices, “assessing
the consequences of all of them taken together” [Read et al., 1999]. Behavioral economics
usually takes the other extreme view, and interprets experimental subjects’ choices as though
they narrowly bracket their choices by ignoring all the other choices they face inside or outside
of the lab. For example, experiments measuring risk aversion assume that subjects ignore
all wealth accrued from decisions outside of the experiment (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman
1992; Holt and Laury 2002). Similarly, those that measure social preferences rely on subjects
bracketing equity considerations only in terms of lab payments, ignoring all other people and
other decisions outside of that interaction (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999).1 Since multiple
interrelated decisions are the rule rather than the exception, choice bracketing plays an
important role in predicting and interpreting behavior. For instance, leading behavioral
models, like loss aversion, make predictions that are sensitive to how a person brackets
Department of Economics at London School of Economics and Department of Economics at Simon Fraser
University.
1In addition, experimental estimates of time preferences over dated rewards require subjects to ignore bor-
rowing opportunities outside of the lab – and would find many subjects irrational if they assumed otherwise
[Cubitt and Read, 2007].
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[Read et al., 1999], and combining loss aversion with narrow bracketing helps to explain the
equity premium puzzle [Benartzi and Thaler, 1995] and the stock market non-participation
puzzle [Barberis et al., 2006].
While economists have devoted considerable intellectual energy to studying preferences,
comparatively little is known about bracketing. While existing literature provides strong
evidence that many people fail to bracket broadly [Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, Rabin and
Weizsäcker, 2009], it has not provided tests of alternative models of bracketing, including the
most widely applied alternative, narrow bracketing. One reason for this is that preferences
and choice bracketing jointly determine behavior, so separating the two presents a challenging
inference problem.
This paper provides theoretical tests of both narrow and broad bracketing and an experi-
mental design that allows us to perform these tests in natural economic domains. The central
innovation behind our approach is to distinguish between the allocation at the level of a “de-
cision” from those made in the “subdecisions” that comprise it when overall consumption
depends only on the final bundle of goods summed across purchases at all of its constituent
subdecisions. This distinction is important and observable in many settings, such as with
scanner consumption data. There, we call each of the household’s choice of which bundle to
purchase from a given store, and its total purchases across all stores comprise the decision.
In our experiment, subjects choose an allocation from standard budget sets, some of which
are linked to form an overall decision. Final consumption is based on a randomly selected
decision and equals the sum of their choices from the linked budget sets comprising it. The
flexibility of our approach allows it to be deployed in almost all classical economic settings.
Our setting gives significant scope for a subject to exhibit behaviors inconsistent with
either or both types of bracketing, as well as a partial-narrow bracketing model (based
on Barberis et al. 2006). To test bracketing without observing the subject’s preference, we
develop revealed-preference conditions for testing when behavior is consistent with each type
of bracketing. Then, we design and deploy experiments that apply these tests to experimental
portfolio choices for both risk and social allocations. Finally, we modify our experimental
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design by experimentally inducing subjects’ utility function over fictitious goods to allow us
to directly measure choice bracketing while directly controlling utility.
Our approach tests the consistency of preferences revealed from choices under different
models of bracketing. A broad bracketer’s choice in a given decision reveals that she prefers
that final bundle to any other feasible aggregate allocation for that decision – regardless of
the details of the subdecisions that comprise it. In contrast, a narrow bracketer’s choice in a
given subdecision reveals that she prefers that allocation to any other feasible allocation in
that subdecision – regardless of the other subdecisions she faces in that decision. We design
our experiment so that each subject makes decisions both that have overlapping aggregate
budget sets and that have subdecisions in common, and test the two models with the choices
from these decisions. Because these comparisons may not exhaust the testable implications
of these models, we also deploy revealed preference tests that capture indirect implications
as well.
We reject broad bracketing for 85-100% of our subjects across the three treatments, even
allowing a slight deviation from the its predictions. Narrow bracketing does much better:
we only reject it for 40-45% of subjects. Nonetheless, 45%-57% are inconsistent with both
narrow and broad bracketing. Fewer subjects fail our tests of partial-narrow bracketing than
either narrow or broad. However, this model places weaker restrictions on behavior than the
other two. To adjust for this, we apply the Selten [1991] score at the subject level to class
each subject to one of the three models based on predictive success. We find that 75% of
subjects are best described as narrow bracketers, 14% as broad bracketers, while only 4%
are classified to intermediate cases of partial-narrow bracketing.2
One interpretation of our findings is that failures of broad bracketing do not appear to
involve intermediate deviations from a rational benchmark. Instead, most subjects are best
described as either narrowly or broadly bracketing. This indicates that narrow bracketing
may best be viewed as a “heuristic” rather than a “bias”. For instance, people may narrowly
bracket because they are unaware of how to broadly bracket, or are unaware that broad
bracketing can lead to notably higher payoffs, or choose to employ narrow bracketing to
2The test refuses to classify the remaining 7%.
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Table 1. Tversky and Kahneman’s Decision problem
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First, examine
both decisions, then indicate the options you prefer.
Decision (i). Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240 [85%] B. 25% chance to gain $1000,
and 75% chance to gain nothing [16%]
Decision (ii). Choose between:
C. a sure loss of $750 [13%] D. 75% chance to lose $1000,
and 25% chance to lose nothing [87%]
simplify their decision-making. Our study has focused on measurement and does not attempt
to disentangle these explanations.
Related literature. Tversky and Kahneman [1981] performed the seminal study of narrow
bracketing. Tversky and Kahneman pose their subjects the decision problem described in
Table 1. They find that 73% of subjects choose A and D, which is first-order stochastically
dominated by the pair of decisions B and C. When they instead provide subjects with a choice
between two lotteries “25% chance to win $240, and 75% chance to lose $760” (A and D)
and “25% chance to win $250 and 75% chance to lose $750” (B and A), all choose the latter.
Rabin and Weizsäcker [2009] revisit the Tversky and Kahneman design, conducting both
incentivized and unincentivized lab experiments as well as unincentivized field experiments.
With incentivized choices, 28% of their subjects make the A and D choice as compared with
11% who choose B and C; higher fractions do so when unincentivized.3 They also estimate
a structural model that imposes homogeneous risk preference and that each subject either
broadly or narrowly brackets. Their survey data is best fit with parameters that imply 11% of
their population broadly brackets; the remaining fraction brackets narrowly by assumption.
While the Tversky-Kahneman and Rabin-Weizacker designs can rule out broad bracket-
ing, they cannot falsify narrow bracketing. Moreover, their results are uninformative about
the choice bracketing of subjects who do not choose A and D. In contrast, our experiment
has subjects choose from a budget set in each subdecision, extending choice-from-budget-
set experimental designs [Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Choi et al., 2007] to study decisions
3Koch and Nafziger [2019] also document failures of broad bracketing in the Tversky-Kahneman task, finding
32% do so. Their main goal is to study the relationship between narrow bracketing, influence of varying an
experimental endowment, mental budgeting, and measures of motivational bracketing.
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composed of multiple subdecisions. This allows us to identify choice bracketing at the sub-
ject level. The rich nature of each subdecision allows the data to falsify both narrow and
broad bracketing for a wide range of underlying preferences and detect intermediate degrees
of choice bracketing. In addition, the novel induced-utility design in our Shopping experi-
ment controls for unobserved preferences and thus allows us to measure bracketing directly.
Nonetheless, our end numbers for narrow bracketing are similar to Rabin and Weizsacker’s,
despite the difference in experimental designs and identification strategies.
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s work, a number of related experiments and attendant
behavioral concepts have been proposed. Read et al. [1999] introduce the umbrella term
“choice bracketing” to refer to how an individuals group “individual choices together into
sets”. In particular, the concepts of endowment bracketing [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979],
mental budgeting [Thaler, 1985], and temporal bracketing [Gneezy and Potters, 1997] have
been particularly relevant within behavioral and experimental economics.
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] find that, when subjects are endowed with experimental
income and then given a choice between lotteries, they make almost identical choices re-
gardless of the experimentally-endowed income. However, they make different choices when
the amount of experimental endowment is instead explicitly incorporated into the prizes
of available lotteries to create an economically-identical choice problem. We refer to this
as “endowment bracketing”. Recent work by Exley and Kessler [2018] arrives at a similar
finding in a social allocation task: respondents tend to allocate equal numbers of money-
valued tokens from a given account between two anonymous others even when these others
were endowed with unequal numbers of differently-labelled-and-valued tokens. Endowment
bracketing emerges as a special case of our framework where all but one subdecision of an
underlying decision are degenerate.
Thaler (1985, 1999) introduces the idea of mental budgeting to capture a consumer who
brackets broadly within categories of goods, but narrowly across categories. This provides a
particular approach to specifying choice brackets. The mental budgeting approach has been
useful in applications to finance (e.g. as in the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman 1985
and Odean 1998; see also Imas, 2016), the study of flypaper effects [Hines and Thaler, 1995,
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Abeler and Marklein, 2017], and some consumption choices (Hastings and Shapiro 2013,
2018). Recent work derives mental accounts endogenously: Kőszegi and Matějka [2020]
derive mental accounts as a response to attention costs in a rational inattention framework,
and Lian [2019] does so in a framework in which a decision-maker has different imperfect
information in each subdecision.4,5
Our approach to bracketing allows different subdecisions to involve the same goods, and
our experimental tests rely on this feature. In contrast to mental budgeting, a subdecision
(e.g. one store) may have goods from many categories, and a category may be involved in
many subdecisions. Nevertheless if a specification of categories is given, then our theoreti-
cal approach could be modified to test the hypotheses of (i) broad bracketing within each
category, and (ii) narrow bracketing across categories. We see this as a fruitful direction for
future work.6
In the context of repeated decision-making under risk, the question arises as to how risks
that resolve at different times are temporally bracketed, together or apart. Gneezy and
Potters [1997] and show that subjects invest less in a risky asset when decisions are made
and returns shown period-by-period than when they must invest for three periods at a time.
They introduce the term “myopic loss aversion” to refer to loss aversion applied myopically at
the horizon of a given decision. Their experimental designs can be modeled in our framework,
and if underlying preferences are loss averse, then our definition of narrow bracketing implies
myopic loss aversion.
4However, Lian models each decision variable as a choice in R whereas we study subdecisions in Rn. His
model can be applied to our setting by mapping each of Lian’s decision variables to a relevant “subdecision”,
and assuming that information is the same for all decision variables within each subdecision. One substantive
consequence is that we assume that good i in subdecision k ought to be a perfect substitute for good i in
subdecision k′, which cannot be accommodated in Lian’s model under his assumption of strictly concave
utility. In Lian’s model, a narrow thinker will best-respond to her conditional expectation about her behavior
in other subdecisions – which will only generate what we term “narrow bracketing” if a decision-maker expects
that, on average, other subdecisions in a decision involve buying zero of each good.
5Related work by Galperti [2019] endogenously derives mental budgets as an optimal response to allow a
person to counteract present bias while allowing flexibility to respond to taste shocks that affect intratemporal
trade-offs.
6Blow and Crawford [2018] provide theoretical revealed preference conditions for mental budgeting when
mental accounts are neither observed nor pre-specified.
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While our discussion of the literature has focused on papers explicitly about choice brack-
eting and its relatives, all economic modeling makes an assumption about how agents bracket
their choices – though this is usually implicit. In the interests of parsimony [Gabaix and
Laibson, 2008], no economic model completely captures all potentially interrelated decisions
its agents actually face, broken down into subdecisions the way they face them. A model’s
predictive accuracy will thus crucially depend on whether assumptions about bracketing,
made in the interests of parsimony, are either behaviorally accurate or innocuous due to a
lack of complements or substitutes across subdecisions. Our laboratory experiments provide
empirical basis for judging the descriptive realism of assumptions made in practice.
1. Theory
We consider a data set describing the choices of a decision-maker (DM) who faces decision
problem involving bundles of goods in Rn. Each decision potentially consists of multiple
concurrent subdecisions, but consumption following a decision problem only depends on the
final bundle of goods obtained from all subdecisions in that decision. We index each decision
by t and each subdecision by k.
We observe a finite sequence of T choices from decision problems
D =
{(
xt,k, Bt,k
)}
(t,k)
with xt,k denoting the alternative selected and Bt,k indicating the feasible set from subdeci-
sion k of decision t. The alternative consumed for a given decision t is labeled xt and is the
sum of the choices in each subdecision k of t:
xt =
∑
{(t′,k′):t′=t}
xt
′,k′ .
We assume that each decision problem is faced independently from and in the same set of
economic circumstances as the others.7 Thus there are no complementarities across decision
7The order of the subdecisions does not matter, and in our experiment it will be varied. We assume that
the DM behaves identically in decisions t and s when Bt,k = Bs,pi(k) for some permutation pi over all the
subdecisions corresponding to decision t.
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problems – only among subdecisions within the same decision problem.8 For instance, in
each of our experiments, one of T decisions is randomly selected and paid out. A real world
analogue consists of a scanner data set with purchases at different stores (subdecisions —
different k) in a given time period (t), where the DM consumes these purchases after buying
at all stores but before the next period.
We are interested in understanding how the DM takes into account the other subdecisions
in a decision when making each subdecision. In particular, does she take into account that
good i in subdecision k is a perfect substitute for good i in subdecision k′? Following the
behavioral economics literature, we consider three models of how a person brackets the
subdecisions of an underlying decision.
Neoclassical economics considers rational DMs who take the interaction between all the
subdecisions fully into account. We call this broad bracketing. Let Bt denote the feasible set
of final bundles for the decision problem,
Bt =
 ∑{(t′,k′):t′=t}xt
′,k′ : xt′,k′ ∈ Bt,k
 .
Formally, the data set is rationalized by broad bracketing if there exists an increasing utility
function u : Rn → R so that xt maximizes u over Bt,
xt = arg max
x∈Bt
u (x)
for every t ∈ T . That is, a broad bracketer recognizes that her subdecisions define an
underlying budget set, and she makes each subdecision to maximizes some utility function
over the underlying budget set.
A number of experiments have documented that subjects fail to broadly bracket. Instead,
they propose that agents may make optimize within each subdecision in isolation. That is,
they ignore the possibility of substituting across subdecisions. We follow the literature in
calling this narrow bracketing. Formally, the data set is rationalized by narrow bracketing if
8This is analogous to assumptions used in empirical revealed preference analysis Crawford and De Rock
[2014] and in empirical tests of decision theoretical axioms and models that use more than one decision.
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there exists an increasing u : Rn → R so that
xt,k = arg max
x∈Bt,k
u (x)
for every subdecision (t, k). That is, the DM has an underlying preference over alternatives
but maximizes this preference subdecision-by-subdecision. 9
Finally, we consider the possibility of an intermediate model lying between the two ex-
tremes. We focus on one example, called partial-narrow bracketing. We say that the data
set is rationalized by α-partial-narrow bracketing if there exists an increasing u : Rn → R so
that
xt,k = arg max
x∈Bt,k
αu (x) + (1− α)u
 ∑
{(t′,k′):t′=t,k′ 6=k}
xt
′,k′ + x

for every subdecision (t, k). The partial-narrow bracketing model is inspired by Barberis
et al. [2006], Barberis and Huang [2009] as adapted by Rabin and Weizsäcker [2009, p.
1513].10 The DM takes into account her choices in the other subdecisions but only partially.
This captured in the broadly bracketed utility term, which is weighted by (1 − α). The
remaining weight is attached to her payoff from her choice in the current subdecision, as
if there were no other subdecisions. When α = 0, the model coincides with broad brack-
eting, and when α = 1, it coincides with narrow. The α-partial-narrow bracketing model
defines a “personal equilibrium” of an intrapersonal game [Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006]. We
can strengthen the model’s predictive power by assuming that the DM selects her “preferred
personal equilibrium”: the personal equilibrium that maximizes the α-weighted average of
9A narrow bracketer acts as if she perceives alternatives correctly and maximizes a well-behaved preference
over them, but misperceives the budget set. In contrast, a DM who misperceived correlation, e.g. Eyster
and Weizsacker [2016] or Ellis and Piccione [2017], perceives the choice set correctly but misperceives the
alternatives themselves.
10The first two papers consider an average of the certainty equivalents – u−1(E[u(xt)]) +
b0
∑
{(t′,k′):t′=t,k′ 6=k}
v−1(E[v(xt,k)]) – while the last consider an average of expected utilities. Since we do
not impose expected utility, the partial-narrow bracketing model coincides with it when v = u. All allow
for the narrow utility function to differ from the broad utility function; the algorithm in Theorem 1 can be
adapted to accommodate this at the cost of less predictive power.
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the sum of narrowly-bracketed utilities and the overall broadly bracketed utility.11 We do so
for our experimental results, which does not significantly affect the overall number of subject
consistent with partial-narrow bracketing.
In real world settings, we observe neither the utility function u nor the degree of partial-
narrow bracketing α. Nonetheless, the three models have distinct testable implications for
observable choices. We turn now to describing these implications.
Broad bracketing implies that the DM maximizes her underlying preferences on a feasible
set defined at the decision problem level, i.e. over Bt rather than Bt,k. With this specification
of budget sets, one can apply classic tests of preference maximization to test the model.
That is, we can apply revealed preference tests like Weak, Strong, and Generalized Axioms
of Revealed Preference (WARP, SARP, and GARP) to the ancillary data set
DBB =
{(
xt, Bt
)}
t∈T .
These tests must be adapted (as in Forges and Minelli 2009) because Bt is typically non-linear
even if each Bt,k is linear.
Similarly, narrow bracketing implies that the DM maximizes an underlying preference on
a feasible set equal to each subdecision, i.e. over Bt,k rather than Bt. As above, one can
apply classic tests of preference maximization to test the model. Here, the ancillary data set
is
DNB =
{(
xi, Bi
)}N
i=1
where each data point (xi, Bi) corresponds to a data point from a subdecision and vice
versa; formally, there exists a bijection b from {1, . . . , N} to the pairs (t, k) of decisions and
subdecisions so that (xi, Bi) =
(
xb(i), Bb(i)
)
for every i. That is, DNB is the original data set
but where each subdecision is treated as a separate, independent observation.
11In this problem, a maximizer of the selection-from-personal equilibria criterion function (known as a “choice
acclimating personal equilibrium” in the sense of Kőszegi and Rabin [2007]) is also a personal equilibrium
and thus a preferred personal equilibrium. Thus standard tools can be used to determine that a maximizer
exists under standard assumptions on u and {Bt,k}k.
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Recall the definition of SARP. A bundle x is directly revealed preferred to y in the data
set D, written xPDy, if there exists a budget set B so that (x,B) ∈ D and y ∈ B\{x}. The
data set D satisfies SARP if the binary relation PD is acyclic.
We clarify that applying SARP to the data sets DBB and DNB captures the complete
implications for broad and narrow bracketing, respectively.
Theorem 1. The following are true:
(i) The data set DBB satisfies SARP if and only if D is rationalizable by broad bracketing,
(ii) The data set DNB satisfies SARP if and only if D is rationalizable by narrow bracketing,
and
(iii) There exists a decidable algorithm that outputs 1 if and only if D is rationalizable by
α-partial-narrow bracketing.
Theorem 1 provides standard, albeit indirect, tests for broad and narrow bracketing. These
conditions are readily applied and provide tests for the bracketing with only minimal restric-
tions on preference. Moreover, they can be easily augmented to include additional structure
on preferences. For instance, we impose that preferences are symmetric when we apply these
tests to our experiments.
The algorithm that tests α-partial-narrow bracketing is described in Appendix A. It re-
duces the problem of determining whether D is consistent with α−partial-narrow bracketing
to that of a standard linear programming problem. We elaborate on the ideas behind the
partial-narrow test here, and provide a formal proof in Appendix A.
The algorithm starts by mapping the DM’s choice in each subdecision into the narrow
bundle, and final (broad) bundle it generates. It then performs a revealed preference analysis
on these bundle pairs that tests for the existence of a u such that utility of each pair is the
additive sum of the utilities of the narrow and final bundles each evaluated according to u
and weighted α and 1− α respectively. The choices in the other subdecisions determine the
overall feasible set that applies for a subdecision. This test is based on Clark’s [1993] test
of expected utility over lotteries but where utilities are weighted by α and 1 − α instead
of by objectively-given probabilities. Our test then checks for the existence of dominating
combinations of choices across subdecisions.
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Taken together, Theorem 1 provides an exact test of when a given data set is consistent
with a particular form of bracketing. However, the tests are binary and, if negative, do not
reveal which decisions caused the failure or account for mistakes by the subjects. We can use
the insights developed from this approach to design more direct tests, and to strengthen these
tests when we are in a position to make stronger assumptions about underlying preferences.
The key takeaway from the theorem is that testing bracketing requires comparing decisions
and subdecisions in a way that controls for unobserved preferences. To conduct a simple test
of broad bracketing, compare a decision consisting of two subdecisions with one composed
a single subdecision for which the feasible aggregate alternatives coincide. To conduct a
simple test of narrow bracketing, compare a subdecision from decision problem t to the
exact same subdecision, or a subdecision with as part of another decision (for example, as
its own standalone decision).We formalize the above predictions as follows specialized to the
case where each decision has at most two subdecisions.
Prediction 1 (NB-WARP). Suppose D is rationalized by narrow bracketing.
If (xt,k, Bt,k), (xt′,k′ , Bt′,k′) ∈ D and xt′,k′ ∈ Bt,k ⊆ Bt′,k′ , then xt,k = xt′,k′ .
Prediction 2 (BB-WARP). Suppose D is rationalized by broad bracketing.
If Bt, Bt′ ∈ D and xt′ ∈ Bt ⊆ Bt′ , then xt = xt′ .
These two predictions, as the names suggest, reflect the appropriate manifestations of
WARP to our setting. Narrow bracketing requires that WARP holds when comparing any
pair of subdecisions, even when they are part of economically different decisions. Broad
bracketing implies that WARP holds at the decision problem level, comparing final bundles
feasible in both aggregate budget sets.
Prediction 3 (BB-Mon). Suppose D is rationalized by broad bracketing.
For any y ∈ Bt, y ≥ xt if and only if y = xt.
BB-Mon requires that the subject chooses on the frontier of her aggregate budget set in
a given decision. For a decision with two Walrasian budget sets with different price ratios,
BB-Mon requires that the DM chooses an extreme allocation. In the subdecision where good
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i is relatively cheaper, she must exhaust the budget on good i, or consume none of good i
in the other. Otherwise, she forgoes the opportunity to consume more of each good.
We can make tighter predictions by imposing more structure on the utility function that
rationalizes the data. The main piece of structure we will impose is that the DM treats each
of the dimensions symmetrically – an assumption we induce in our experimental designs.12
The revealed preference tests above are easily adapted to include symmetry. In Appendix
B, we derive some immediate implications of it. For instance, a narrow bracketer should
purchase at least as much of the cheaper good in each subdecision (NB-Sym). Similarly, a
broad bracketer should purchase at leas as much of the good that has a cheaper overall cost
in each subdecision (BB-Sym). The chief advantage of the symmetry assumptions will be to
increase the predictive power of partial-narrow bracketing.
2. Experimental Design
We design and conduct three experiments to test the models of bracketing in different
domains of choice and to measure α in an induced-utility experiment. In each experiment,
a participant faces five decision rounds, each consisting of one or two subdecisions. Each
subdecision consists of all feasible integer-valued bundles of two goods obtained from a
linear (or in one case, a piece-wise linear) budget set. At the end of the experiment, exactly
one decision is randomly selected, and the subject’s choices in that round’s subdecisions
determine payment. By design, there are no complementarities across decision problems.
More specifically, one of the five rounds is selected as the one that counts. If a round
with two subdecisions is selected for payment, a final bundle consisting of the two goods is
calculated based on the (vector) sum of their chosen bundles in each of the two budgets.
Otherwise, the bundle chosen in the round that counts equals the final bundle. The final
bundle of goods determines payments.
We implement this experimental design to study choice bracketing in three domains of
interest. In two of these, namely portfolio choice under risk and a social allocation task, we
expect participants to have heterogeneous preferences. Our theoretical approach allows us
12Formally, the rationalizing utility function u invariant to permutations: for any bijection pi : {1, . . . , n} →
{1, . . . , n}, u (x1, . . . , xn) = u
(
xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)
)
.
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to control for this heterogeneity and test for how subjects bracket independently of the form
of heterogeneity. In the third, we induce subjects’ utility function in a shopping experiment.
This induced-utility treatment allows us to measure α without having to infer utility.
In the Risk Experiment, each subdecision asks the subject to choose an integer allocation
of tokens between two assets. Each asset pays off on only one of two equally likely states:
asset A (or C) pays out only in state A (dice roll of 1-3) whereas asset B (or D) pays out
only in state B (dice roll of 4-6). The payoff of each asset varies across decision problems
and across subdecisions. Because each decision problem uses of assets with two equally likely
states, preferences over portfolios of monetary payoffs for each state should be symmetric
across states.
In the Social Experiment, each subdecision asks the subject to choose an integer allocation
of tokens between two anonymous other subjects, person A and person B. The value of each
token to A and B varies across decision problems and across subdecisions. Because the two
recipients are anonymous, we expect preferences to be symmetric across money allocated to
A versus B.13
In the Shopping Experiment, each subdecision asks the subject to choose a bundles of
integer quantities of fictitious “apples” and “oranges” subject to a budget constraint. The
monetary payment for the experiment is calculated from the final bundle in the round that
counts according to the function $pay= 25
(√
#apples +
√
#oranges
)2
.14 This induced-utility
design in the allows us to test models of choice bracketing without having to estimate utility.
Moreover, we build on the following fact to estimate the coefficient of narrow bracketing, α,
for the partial-narrow bracketing model.
Fact 1 (Identification of α.). Suppose that u is a known differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave function and D is rationalized by partial-narrow bracketing. Further suppose that
13Note that the budgets in the Risk and Social experiments were designed to be identical up to the translation
across domains. One round per anonymous group of two subjects was implemented to determine payments
of another anonymous group of two subjects, whereas in the other experiments, one round of the experiment
was randomly selected for each subject to determine their payment.
14Subjects were provided with a payoff table (Appendix C, Figure 13) to calculate the earnings that would
result from any possible final bundle, so could maximize earnings without having to manually compute this
function.
REVEALING CHOICE BRACKETING 15
Risk Social Shopping
Decision Subdecision I Asset A/C Asset B/D I VA VB I pa po
D1 1 10 ($1, $0) ($0, $1.20) 10 $1 $1.20 8 2 1
2 16 ($1, $0) ($0, $1) 16 $1 $1 24 2 2
D2 1 14 ($2, $0) ($0, $2) 14 $2 $2 32 2 1 (for 1st 8), 2
D3 1 10 ($1, $0) ($0, $1) 10 $1 $1 30 3 3
2 10 ($1, $0) ($0, $1.20) 10 $1 $1.20 24 3 2
D4 1 16 ($1, $0) ($0, $1) 16 $1 $1 12 1 1
D5 1 10 ($1, $0) ($0, $1.20) 10 $1 $1.20 48 6 4
I: income for a subdecision (in tokens)
($x, $y) indicates one VA: value/token to A pa: price/apple
unit of asset pays $x/$y VB : value/token to B po: price/orange
if the dice roll is 1-3/4-6
Table 2. Experimental Tasks
for some t, k, Bt,kis a Walrasian budget set for prices pt,k, and n = 2, p
t,1
1
pt,12
6= pt,21
pt,22
, and
lim
x1→0+
u1(x1,x2)
pt,k1
> lim
x1→0+
u2(x1,x2)
pt,k2
for all x2 > 0.
Then, there exists a unique α that rationalizes choices.
Our experimental budget sets are designed in order to allow us to conduct our revealed
preference tests on our Risk and Social Experiments, and conduct analogous tests that make
use of the induced utility function on our Shopping Experiment.Throughout, we refer to
subdecision k of decision t as Dt.k, or Dt if a round has only one subdecision. A one-
subdecision round, D5, is identical to to D1.1 and to D3.2 in Risk and Social experiments,
that is, B1,1 = B3,2 = B5,1. Similarly, the one-subdecision round Decision 4 is identical to
D1.2, that is B1,2 = B4,1. This allows us to test by NB-WARP by comparing each of D1.1
and D3.2 to D5, and by comparing D1.2 to D4. In order to test BB-WARP, Decision 2 is
a one-subdecision round that lies on top of the aggregate budget set of the two-budget-set
round Decision 1, B1,1 + B1,2 ⊆ B2,1. These allow for direct comparisons that can falsify
narrow and broad bracketing without parametric assumptions on preferences.
REVEALING CHOICE BRACKETING 16
Sessions took place in two experimental economics labs in Canada in during June 2019
to February 2020. Subjects were recruited from the labs’ student participant pools. The
experiment was conducted on paper. After the instructions had been read aloud and subjects
were given the opportunity to ask questions, participants completed a brief comprehension
quiz, and the experimenter individually checked answers and explained any errors. Only one
round was handed out to a subject at a time, and that round was collected before the next
round was handed out. Subjects indicated each choice by highlighting the line corresponding
to their choice for each subdecision using a provided highlighter. Subjects were allowed no
other aids at their desk when making choices. The order of decisions was varied across
participants. Instructions, experimental materials, and details of the experimental procedure
are provided in Appendix C.
3. Results
This section reports the results of our experimental tests of the main predictions of the
models of bracketing. For each test, we also compute results allowing for one or two “errors”
relative to its requirements. We define an error as how far we would need to move a subject’s
choices for them to pass that test, measured in lines on the decision sheet(s). For instance,
in Risk and Social one error implies that the subject would pass the test after shifting one
token from one good to the other in a single subdecision.15 For predictions that require
Walrasian budget sets, we modify the tests to account for discreteness in our experiment.
3.1. Risk and Social Experiments: Revealed Preference Tests of NB-WARP, BB-
WARP, and BB-Mon. We begin by performing the simple, direct tests of bracketing
developed in Section : NB-WARP, BB-WARP, and BB-Mon (Table 3.1).
First, we replicate earlier experimental findings by showing that very few subjects are
broad bracketers. There is only a single pair of decisions (1 and 2) where choices could
directly violate BB-WARP. For that pair, only 12% and 16% of subjects pass BB-WARP, in
Risk and Social respectively. Allowing for one error does not substantially affect pass rates
for BB-WARP, raising both to 20%. Pass rates for BB-Mon for Decisions 1 and 3 are roughly
15In Shopping, one line of adjustment involves adjusting purchase of the cheaper good by one unit. Note
that in Risk and Shopping, we framed tokens as “Experimental Currency Units”.
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similar: 12% and 14% pass in Risk and 14% and 17% pass in Social. In Risk and Social,
we obtain similar figures when allowing for one or two errors. Looking at both decisions, we
find that 7% and 12% of subjects pass BB-Mon in Risk and Social respectively, and these
pass rates only marginally increase in Risk to 8% but do not in Social, when allowing for one
error.16 These numbers are qualitatively similar to those found by Tversky and Kahneman
[1981] and Rabin and Weizsäcker [2009].
We go beyond previous work by testing narrow bracketing as well. We find that 57% and
44% of subjects exactly pass the NB-WARP test that compares the choices in D1.1 to D5
in the Risk and Social Experiments, respectively. Allowing for one error raises these pass
rates to 77% and 69%. That is, across both experiments, a strong majority of decisions are
within one error of passing NB-WARP. We obtain quantitatively similar pass rates from the
NB-WARP tests comparing D3.2 to D5.1 and the tests from comparing D1.2 and D4. If we
jointly conduct all possible NB-WARP tests in both Decisions 1 and 3, 29% and 27% pass,
while those rates rise to 44% and 53% if we allow for one error. While narrow bracketing
does much better, some subjects are inconsistent with both NB-WARP and BB-WARP.
Result 1. When allowing for one error, 45% and 53% of subjects pass NB-WARP, 20% and
20% pass BB-WARP, and 16% and 17% pass BB-Mon in the Risk and Social Experiments,
respectively.
By design, symmetry is a natural restriction in our experiments – the two states are equally
likely in Risk, and the two other individuals are anonymous in Social. Thus, we can conduct
similar decision-by-decision tests of narrow, broad, and partial-narrow bracketing while as-
suming symmetric preferences – using the restrictions implied by symmetry to eliminate the
need to compare across decisions. We call these tests NB-Sym, BB-Sym, and PNB-Sym, and
derive and perform them in Appendix B. Unsurprisingly, we observe very similar pass rates
for our NB-Sym tests of narrow bracketing as we did for NB-WARP. However, we observe
16We note that allowing for two errors substantially raises pass rates of BB-WARP in Risk and Social to
almost all subjects. While the vast majority of subjects, 66% in Risk and 84% in Social, allocate equally
between assets/people A and B in Decision 2, an allocation of 9 or more units to A in Decision 2 generates
a bundle that is not dominated by any available bundle in the aggregate feasible set for Decision 1. Any
subjects who make such an allocation vacuously satisfy BB-WARP in those decisions.
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Risk Social
# errors 0 1 2 0 1 2
NB-WARP (D1.1 and D5) 56 76 89 45 70 77
NB-WARP (D1.2 and D4)) 56 74 81 63 78 82
NB-WARP (D3.2 and D5) 54 76 83 49 75 80
NB-WARP (D1.1 and D3.2) 49 76 85 51 83 87
NB-WARP (all) 29 44 61 28 54 64
BB-WARP (D1 and D2) 13 20 87 16 20 94
BB-Mon (D1) 12 13 15 14 14 14
BB-Mon (D3) 14 16 18 17 17 18
BB-Mon (both) 7 8 10 12 12 12
# subjects 99 102
Entries count the # of subjects who pass test at the listed error allowance.
Table 3. Tests of NB-WARP and BB-WARP
Risk Social
# errors 0 1 2 0 1 2
NB-SARP 23 34 43 15 36 44
BB-SARP 0 0 0 8 10 10
PNB-Algorithm 49 59 71 31 58 69
# subjects 99 102
Entries count the # of subjects who pass each test at the listed error allowance.
Table 4. Full Tests of Symmetric NB-, BB-, and PNB- Models
lower pass rates of BB-Sym – no subjects in Risk pass it when allowing for one error, and
only 10% of subjects pass it in Social. Pass rates are much higher for PNB-Sym – when
allowing for one error across both Decisions 1 and 3, 89% and 75% pass in Risk and Social
respectively – but this includes only 23% and 21% additional subjects beyond those that
pass either NB-Sym or BB-Sym.
We next conduct our revealed preference tests of symmetric versions of the three models
considered. Table 3.1 shows how many subjects pass each test.
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No subjects pass our test for broad bracketing, BB-SARP, in the Risk Experiment, and
only 8% pass in Social. When allowing for up to two errors, this number remains the same for
Risk and increases to 10% for Social. Substantially more pass NB-SARP, our test for narrow
bracketing: 23% and 15% of subjects are exactly consistent with all restrictions imposed by
narrow bracketing in Risk and Social, respectively. Allowing for two errors, these pass rates
rise to 43% in both experiments. While 50% and 30% of subjects in Risk and Social are
consistent with partial-narrow bracketing, we note that any subject who passes NB-SARP
or BB-SARP is necessarily consistent with partial-narrow bracketing. Hence, only 26% and
8% are consistent with partial-narrow bracketing but neither narrow nor broad bracketing.
When allowing for two errors, these numbers change to 28% and 15%. This leaves 26%
and 33% of subjects inconsistent with all three models of bracketing we consider, even when
allowing for two errors.
Result 2. When allowing for two errors relative to each test, 43% of subjects in both setting
pass NB-SARP. Only 0% and 10% of subjects pass respectively BB-SARP, while an additional
28% and 15% of subjects pass the PNB algorithm but neither NB- nor BB-SARP, in the Risk
and Social Experiments, respectively.
We note that our tests that require symmetric preferences and choices to reveal strict
preferences, and consequently subjects with linear preferences, such as those who maximize
expected or total payoffs, fail our tests.17 A subject with linear preferences makes the same
choices in any data set regardless of how she brackets, so this does not bias our results in favor
of a given type of bracketing. Five subjects in Risk and two subjects in Social make choices
consistent with linearity throughout the experiment. However, they have limited influence
on our overall results. Out of these seven subjects, one each in Risk and in Social pass the
tests for narrow bracketing. The other subject in Social is within one error of passing all tests
of broad bracketing. Two other subjects in Risk always allocated their entire portfolio to the
cheaper asset, consistent with either risk-seeking or risk-neutral expected utility preferences.
17Risk- or inequity- seeking preferences also predict extreme choices that are also consistent with linear
preferences. We note that linear preferences pass the tests only if indifference is broken in the direction of
aversion.
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D1 D3 Both Full
# errors 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
NB 23 23 60 53 65 69 20 21 49 15 16 40
BB 20 21 27 23 24 24 12 14 17 11 13 15
PNB 44 45 95 76 91 98 32 36 68 26 29 55
# subjects 101
Entries count the # of subjects who pass each test at the listed error allowance.
Table 5. Shopping Tests
Consequently, the two pass BB-WARP and NB-WARP but fail NB-Sym and BB-Sym. The
remaining three subjects are not within two errors of passing any of the tests.
3.2. Shopping Experiment: Induced Utility Tests and Estimates of α. The tests
of our predictions thus far assume that utility is not observed. When utility is known, as
in our Shopping Experiment, narrow and broad bracketing each make unique predictions in
each decision. To test the models, we compare how far the subjects are from each model’s
predictions (Table 3.2).
Testing all implications of narrow bracketing in each of Decisions 1 and 3, 23% and 52%
of subjects are respectively exactly consistent with narrow bracketed maximization, while
20% are consistent in both. We obtain similar results when allowing for 1 error, but when
allowing for 2 errors, 59% of subjects pass narrow bracketing in Decision 1, 68% of subjects
in Decision 3, and 49 in both.18 15% of subjects are exactly consistent with all implications
of narrow bracketing, while 40% are within two errors of being consistent.
In contrast, 20% and 23% of subjects are respectively exactly consistent with broadly
bracketed maximization in Decisions 1 and 3, respectively, while only 12% are consistent in
both. When allowing for 2 errors, those numbers remain similar – increasing to 27%, 24%,
18The sharp difference between 1- and 2- error tests in Decision 1 but not Decision 3 results from the fact that
40 subjects selected x1,1a = 2, x1,1o = 4, which is the second-best available bundle from a narrow bracketer’s
perspective but is two lines away from the best bundle of x1,1a = 1, x1,1o = 6 – due to the discreteness of
the budget set, 1 apple and 5 oranges was between these bundles. We note that this deviation is in the
opposite direction of that predicted by broad or partial-narrow bracketing, and 32 of these subjects also
selected x1,2a = x1,2o = 6.
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and 17%. We find that 11% of subjects are exactly consistent with all implications of broad
bracketed maximization, while 15% of subjects are within 2 errors of being so consistent.
Partial-narrow bracketing appears to describe few additional subjects beyond those con-
sistent with narrow and broad bracketing in each test. In Decisions 1 and 3, only 1 (1%)
and 0 of additional subjects are consistent with partial-narrow bracketing but neither narrow
nor broad bracketing. No additional subjects were consistent with partial-narrow bracketing
when testing both decisions. When allowing for 2 errors, partial-narrow bracketing captures
an additional 8%, 5%, and 2% of subjects beyond those consistent with narrow and broad
bracketing in Decisions 1, 3, and both respectively. But when testing the full implications of
each model, partial-narrow bracketing does not accommodate additional subjects whether
allowing for 0, 1, or 2 errors.
Result 3. In the Shopping Experiment, allowing for two errors, 40% of subjects pass nar-
row bracketing, 15% pass broad bracketing, and no additional subjects pass partial-narrow
bracketing.
Since we induce the utility function, we are able to measure α exactly (up to limits imposed
by discretization of the budget sets). To that end, we compute the point predictions of the
partial-narrow bracketing model for each α ∈ {0, .01, .02, . . . , .99, 1} for Decisions 1 and 3,
and obtain distinct predictions for nine distinct ranges of α. We assign each subject to
the range of α for which their choices exhibits the fewest errors relative to that range’s
predictions.
We find that 64% of subjects are classified to a range that includes α = 1 – full narrow
bracketing – and 24% are classified to a range that includes α = 0 – full broad bracketing
(Figure 1). Strikingly, no subjects are classified to the range α ∈ [.25, .72), in spite of this
range comprising 47% of the parameter space considered.
Result 4. In the Shopping Experiment, we find that 64% of subjects are best fit by α = 0,
24% by α = 1, and none by any α ∈ (.25, .72].
3.3. Classifying subjects to models. The comparison thus far of tests of do not make any
adjustment for the fact that partial-narrow bracketing nests narrow and broad bracketing as
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Figure 1. Distribution of estimated values α
polar cases, and thus can accommodate more behavior. To compare the predictive success
of each of the model’s at the subject level, we use a subject-level implementation of the
Selten score [Selten, 1991, Beatty and Crawford, 2011]. For each subject and each model
(symmetric versions for Risk and Social, using the induced utility function for Shopping),
we calculate the number of errors the subject exhibits relative to that model. Then, we
calculate the number of possible choice combinations in the experiment that are consistent
with that model and that number of errors, which we divide by the total number of possible
combinations of choices in the experiment to compute the measure for each subject i and
model m ∈ {broad,narrow,partial} as predictive_successi,m = 1 − #predictive_area_for_i,m#all_possible_choices .19
We use all choices made in the experiment to assign each subject to the model with the
highest predictive success; in cases where every rationalizing model-error pair for a subject
would rationalize more than one million possible combinations of choices in our experiment,
we categorize them “Unclassified”.
19In the Risk and Social experiments, there are (11 × 17) × 15 × (11 × 11) × 17 × 11 = 63468735 possible
combinations of choices. Symmetric narrow bracketing allows 6, 78, 511, and 2275 possible combinations of
choices when allowing for 0, 1, 2, and 3 errors, respectively, whereas symmetric broad bracketing allows 12,
116, 585, and 2071 combinations of choices, and symmetric partial-narrow bracketing allows 35797, 200828,
597728, and 1321328 combinations of choices. Thus, a subject whose choices are consistent with partial-
narrow bracketing will be classified as a partial-narrow bracketer if and only if they are sufficiently far from
being consistent with both broad and narrow bracketing.
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# Selten Score Maximized
Risk Social Shopping
Broad Bracketing 3 10 28
Narrow Bracketing 77 76 72
Partially Narrow Bracketing 6 4 0
Unclassified 13 12 1
Table 6. Classification of subjects
We find that across the three experiments, 71-78% of subjects are classified as narrow
bracketers (Table 6). In contrast, 3%, 10%, and 28% of subjects are classified as broad
bracketers in the Risk, Social, and Shopping experiments respectively. However, almost no
one was classified as a partial-narrow bracketer – 6%, 4%, and 0% in the Risk, Social, and
Shopping experiments were so classified. This suggests that partial-narrow bracketing does
not help explain many subjects’ behavior beyond what can be explained by its two polar
cases.
Result 5. Judging each model’s fit by its predictive success, 71-78% of subjects are classified
as narrow bracketers, 3-28% are classified as broad bracketers, and 0-6% are classified as
partial-narrow bracketers across the three experiments.
3.4. Secondary analyses.
Differences across experiments. One unexpected finding, apparent from the results provided
thus far, is that the rate of broad bracketing varies widely across experiments: we classify as
broad bracketers 28% of subjects in the Shopping, 10% in Social, and 3% in Risk. We find
the difference between Social and Risk is particularly noteworthy since the two experiments
are designed to be exactly the same except for the underlying domain. The probability that
each observed difference in broad bracketing rates between experiments arose purely from
sampling variation is small (p = .08 for Risk vs. Social, p ≤ 0.01 for each of Shopping vs.
Social, Shopping vs. Risk, Fisher’s exact tests).20
20In addition, in Social, a subject’s choices determine the payment of other subjects, which, a priori, we
worried may bias subjects in this experiment against broad bracketing as compared to the Risk experiment.
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Learning to broadly bracket? We find some weak evidence from the Shopping experiment
that subjects tend make decisions that are more consistent with broad bracketing in the
second two-budget-set round they face. We compute the number of errors a subject makes
in each of Decisions 1 and 3 relative to optimal decisions implied by broad bracketing with
the induced utility function. 52 subjects deviate less severely from broad bracketing in the
second two-subdecision round than in the first, while 35 exhibit the opposite (p = .09, sign
test); the average difference is .99 fewer errors in the second two-subdecision round (p = .01,
paired t-test).
However, we do not find analogous evidence in the Risk and Social experiments. In these
experiments, the difference in the deviation from the broad bracketing benchmark implied
by BB-SARP with symmetric preferences is approximately zero from the first to the second
two-budget round. The average difference is -.16 in Risk (p = .70, matched-pairs t-test)
and 0.53 in Social (p = .25). In Risk, 48 subjects exhibit a smaller deviation from broad
bracketing in the first two-budget round compared to the second whereas 44 exihibt the
opposite pattern (p = .75, sign test); the analogous numbers are 45 and 43 in Social 36
(p = .92).
4. Discussion
Roughly half of our subjects pass our tests of narrow bracketing, and over two-thirds pass
when we make some allowance for minor deviations relative to tests. Somewhere between
zero and one quarter of our subjects pass our tests of broad bracketing, a fraction that varies
across experiments. After adjusting for predictive power, at least two-and-a-half times (in
Shopping) and up to 26 times (in Risk) as many subjects are classified as narrow bracketers
than as broad bracketers. Taken together, our results suggest that a majority of people tend
to narrowly bracket, while a noticeable minority broadly bracket.
In contrast, few additional subjects pass our tests of partial-narrow bracketing almost no
subjects are classified as partial-narrow bracketers. Our results thus suggest that this model
of partial-narrow bracketing is not an empirically useful generalization of its polar cases.
However, we note that our experiment is the first to test partial-narrow bracketing and to
REVEALING CHOICE BRACKETING 25
measure α. We hope that future work will build on our design to either corroborate or refine
this point.
We found surprising differences in broad bracketing rates across domains. Specifically,
more subjects broadly bracketed in the induced-utility Shopping Experiment than in Social,
and more in Social than in Risk. This was not hypothesized ex-ante, but taking it at face
value has a number of implications. It suggests, for instance, that the narrow or broad
bracketer classification is not absolute, i.e., some people bracket differently in different situ-
ations. Evidence of some learning to broadly bracket from the Shopping Experiment further
supports this interpretation.
In Risk and Social, decisions involve a subjective element that may differ depending on
one’s preferences, unlike in Shopping. This subjective, as opposed to objective, task distinc-
tion may mediate how people bracket. Perhaps broad bracketing requires a form of reasoning
that people are more likely to engage in when facing a “problem-solving task” than a “choose
what you like” task. We think this is an interesting direction for future work.
Our framework for revealing choice bracketing takes the breakdown of decisions into sub-
decisions as observed or prespecified by the researcher and our experiment implemented a
particular such breakdown. Moreover, we purposefully limit the complementarities between
subdecisions by, for instance, ruling out transfering wealth between budgets. This simpli-
fies analysis but the distinction may not be obvious in more complicated real-world settings
where choice data is insufficiently rich. We hope future experiments will build on our design
to understand how people bracket in richer decision environments and thereby provide the
more direct guidance for both modeling and improving choice bracketing in applications.
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Appendix A. Theoretical Appendix: Proofs, Derivations, and PNB
Algorithm
Proof of Theorem 1. Parts (i) and (ii) follow the usual proof that SARP holds if and only if
a data set is rationalizable; see e.g. Forges and Minelli [2009].
To see (iii), fix α and D. Our approach will be to map the choices in D to an ancillary
data set Dα of choices from lotteries over a finite subset Y ⊆ Rn. Then, it will be shown that
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Dα is consistent with expected utility if and only if D is rationalizable by α-partial-narrow
bracketing
We first introduce some notation. For each pair (t, k), let xt,−k = ∑j 6=k xt,j, pt,k =
(α, xt; (1 − α), xt,k), a lottery over Rn. From these lotteries, let Y ⊆ Rn be a finite set
that includes the union of the supports of the lotteries pt,k, as well as the vector 0; it will
be convenient to take Y equal to this set but that is inessential. Denote by ∆Y the finite
support lotteries over Y . The budget set
Qt,k =
{
(α, y; (1− α), y′) ∈ ∆Y : there exists x ∈ Bt,k so that y′ ≤ x+ xt,−k, y ≤ x
}
is a finite set of lotteries over Y that includes pt,kand any others that are affordable. The
ancillary data set
Dα =
{(
pt,k, Qt,k
)}
(t,k)
where any other interdependencies between the lotteries is ignored.
Observe that if the data is rationalized by α-PNB, then there exists an EU preference V
over ∆Y so that
V
(
pt,k
)
> V
(
qt,k
)
∀qt,k ∈ Qt,k\pt,k.
Let u be the utility index of V and extend to Rn+ by
u∗(z) = max
y≤z,y∈Y
u(y).
Then for any x ∈ Bt,k\xt,k,
αu(xt,k) + (1− α)u(xt,k + xt,−k) > αu∗(x) + (1− α)u∗(x+ xt,−k).
Conditions under which Dα is rationalized by expected utility are well known. Here, we
follow Clark [1993] to get an utility index u over Y .
As standard, p is directly revealed preferred to q, written p  q, if p = pt,k and q ∈ Qt,k for
some index (t, k). Define p % q if p  q or p = q. We say that p is indirectly reveal preferred
via independence to q, written p%˜q, whenever there exist r, p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn ∈ ∆Y ,
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α ∈ (0, 1], and λ1, . . . , λn > 0 so that
αp+ (1− α)r =
n∑
i=1
λipi
αq + (1− α)r =
n∑
i=1
λiqi
pi % qi for all i = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
λi = 1.
and p˜q holds whenever at pi  qi for some i. The Linear Axiom of Revealed Preference
(LARP) is that q%˜p implies that p˜q does not hold. Theorem 3 of Clark (1993), combined
with the finiteness of Dα, implies that %˜ has an expected utility rationalization. Conclude
Dα satisfies LARP if and only if D is rationalized by α-partial-narrow bracketing.
The following algorithm inputs Dα and outputs 1 if and only D is rationalized by α-
partial-narrow bracketing for any rational number α ∈ [0, 1]. For concreteness, set Y =
{y1, y2, . . . , ym}. We can identify p ∈ ∆Y with p ∈ Rm so that pi = p(yi).
Define the matrix A with rows given by pt,k − qt,k for each qt,k ∈ Qt,k\pt,k. A is an m×D
matrix interpreted as strict preference, where D is the number of data points extracted.
Let ~1 be a 1×D matrix of ones and
Aˆ =
 A
~1
 .
Let bˆ be an m+ 1 vector with the first m components 0 and the last 1. Solve the system
min yT bˆ
s.t.AˆTy ≥ 0
for y. The Ellipsoid algorithm provides a polynomial-time solution to this. Let y∗ be the
solution, if one exists. There are two cases:
There is no solution or y∗ satisfies y∗T bˆ ≥ 0. Then, Farkas’s Lemma implies there exists
φ ≥ 0 so that Aˆφ = bˆ. In this case, LARP fails, so return 0. Observe Aφ = 0 and bˆTφ = 1.
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The program is unbounded below or y∗T bˆ < 0. Then, Farkas’s Lemma implies there does
not exist any φ ≥ 0 so that Aˆφ = bˆ. In this case, LARP is satisfied so return 1.
To see why this algorithm works, note that if p˜q, then there exists λ > 0 and a1, . . . , an ∈
A so that
λ(p− q) = ∑φiai
for φi > 0. This is equivalent to p − q ∈ cone(co(A)). LARP holds if p − q ∈ cone(co(A)),
then q − p /∈ cone(co(A)) , or equivalently 0 /∈ cone(co(A)). That is, there does not exist
φ1, . . . , φD ≥ 0 so that ∑φi = 1 and λ > 0 so that
λ
D∑
i=1
φiAi = 0;
here Ai is the ith row of A. The λ is redundant, so this can be rewritten as
Aφ = 0
~1φ = 1
for some vector φ ∈ RDand ~1 is 1×D matrix of ones.
To specialize the above algorithm to preferred personal equilibrium partial-narrow brack-
eting, we perform the analysis decision by decision. Letting n(t) being the number of sub-
decisions in decision t, we consider the lottery
pt = α
( 1
n
, xt,k
)n(t)
k=1
+ (1− α)
(
1, xt
)
to be chosen from the budget set
Qt =
α
( 1
n
, yk
)n(t)
k=1
+ (1− α) (1, y) ∈ ∆Y : there exists zk ∈ Bt,k so that yk ≤ zk and y ≤
n(t)∑
k=1
zk

is a finite set of lotteries over Y that includes pt,kand any others that are affordable. The
ancillary data set
DPPE,α =
{(
pt, Qt
)}
(t)
replaces Dα, and the rest of the proof goes through. 
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Derivations of predictions and their experimental implementations. First, observe that if
relation P is acyclic, it must be anti-symmetric.
Derivation of Prediction 1 (NB-WARP).. Suppose xt′,k′ ∈ Bt,k ⊆ Bt′,k′ . By the definition of
P in NB-SARP, xt′,k′Px for all x ∈ Bt′,k′\{xt′,k′}. Since Bt,k ⊆ Bt′,k′ , it follows that xt′,k′Px
for all x ∈ Bt,k\{xt′,k′}. But if xt,k 6= xt′,k′ , the definition of P would imply xt,kPxt′,k′ , which
would violate acyclicity. Thus xt,k = xt′,k′ .
Discretized implementation in our experiment. In all of our tests of NB-WARP, we have
Bt,k = Bt′,k′ exactly. We thus test NB-WARP exactly, without needing to adjust for dis-
creteness.
Derivation of Prediction 2 (BB-WARP).. Suppose xt′ ∈ Bt ⊆ Bt′ . By the definition of P
in BB-SARP, xt′,k′Px for all x ∈ Bt′\{xt′}. Since Bt ⊆ Bt′ , it follows that xt′Px for all
x ∈ Bt\{xt′}. But if xt 6= xt′ , the definition of P would imply xtPxt′ , which would violate
acyclicity. Thus xt = xt′ .
Discretized implementation in our experiment. In the Risk and Social experiments, coB1,1 +
coB1,2 ⊆ coB2,1. In particular, B2,1 = {($0, $28) ; ($2, $26) ; . . . ; ($28, $0)}}, whereas B1,1 +
B1,2 = {($0, $28) ; ($1, $27) ; . . . ; ($16, $12) ; ($17, $10.80) ; . . . ; ($26, $0)}. Consider two cases.
If x2,1A ≤ $16, the bundle chosen in B2,1 is exactly affordable in B1,1 + B1,2. The caveat
is that the set B1,1 + B1,2 has a higher resolution in this range. We do not adjust for
this, implicitly interpreting and their choice from B2,1 as revealing their preferences over
the coB2,1. However, if this leads a subject to fail BB-WARP, if their preferences are well-
behaved, they would choose in B2,1 one of the closest bundles to their preferred bundle in
coB2,1 and be within one error away from passing BB-WARP.
However, if x2A > $16, then the person reveals a sufficiently strong preference for per-
son/state A over B that their desired bundle in B2 is not affordable in coB1,1 +coB1,2 – thus
they trivially pass BB-WARP.
In the Shopping Experiment, B1,1 + B1,2 = B2,1. We thus test BB-WARP by directly
comparing x2 versus x1.
Derivation of Prediction 3 (BB-Mon). Suppose xt,21 > 0, xt,12 > 0, and pt,11 ≤ pt,12 , pt,21 >
pt,22 . Let  = min{xt,21 , xt,12 }. Consider the alternative pair of choices (yt,1, yt,2) given by
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yt,1 =
(
xt,11 +
pt,12
pt,11
, xt,12 − 
)
and yt,2 =
(
xt,21 − , xt,22 + p
t,2
1
pt,22

)
. By construction, (yt,1, yt,2) is
affordable. We have that
yt,11 + yt,21 = xt,11 + xt,21 +
pt,12 −pt,11
pt,11
 ≥ xt,11 + xt,21 , and
yt,12 + yt,22 = xt,12 + xt,22 +
pt,21 −pt,22
pt,12
 > xt,12 + xt,22
where the inequalities respectively follow from pt,11 ≤ pt,12 and pt,21 > pt,22 . But xtPyt would
violate monotonicity – thus such an xt,1, xt,2 pair could not pass BB-SARP.
Discretized implementation in our experiment. The argument in the proof applies with min-
imal modification to our discretized experiment, and thus we apply the conditions directly.
Appendix B. Tests Assuming Symmetry
B.1. Testable conditions. We present the following testable implications of narrow, broad,
and partial-narrow bracketing when underlying preferences are required to be symmetric.
Prediction 4 (NB-Sym). Suppose D is rationalized by symmetric narrow bracketing and
each Bt,k is a Walrasian budget set for prices pt,k.
If pt,kj ≥ pt,ki , then xt,ki ≥ xt,kj .
With Narrow Bracketing, symmetry’s implications are straightforward. The subject should
purchase at least as much of the cheaper good. With Broad and Partial-Narrow Bracketing,
the implications are more subtle.
Prediction 5 (BB-Sym). Suppose D is rationalized by symmetric broad bracketing, each
Bt,k is a Walrasian budget set for prices pt,k and income I t,k. Then,
(i) if Bt = Bt,1 + Bt,2,pt,11 = pt,12 , and pt,2i > p
t,2
j , then x
t,1
i + x
t,2
i ≤ xt,1j + xt,2j ; if in addition
It,2
pt,2j
≤ It,1
pt,1i
, then xt,2i = 0, and
(ii) if Bt = Bt,1 and pt,1i ≥ pt,1j , then xt,1j ≥ xt,1i .
Prediction 6 (PNB-Sym). Suppose D is rationalized by symmetric partial-narrow brack-
eting and each Bt,k is a Walrasian budget set for prices pt,k. Then,
(i) if Bt = Bt,1 +Bt,2, pt,11 = pt,12 and pt,2i > p
t,2
j , then x
t,2
j ≥ xt,2i and xtj ≥ xti, and
(ii) if Bt = Bt,1 and pt,11 ≥ pt,12 , then xt,12 ≥ xt,11 .
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For an intuition, recall the logic of comparative advantage. The opportunity cost of
consuming good i from Bt,1 is lower than in Bt,2, and vice versa for consuming good j. A
DM should purchases at least as much of the good in the subdecision where it is cheapest
relative to the other good. With Broad Bracketing, this specialization is extreme: if a subject
purchases positive amounts of good i from the second subdecision, then she must exhaust
the budget of the first on good i. Otherwise, she forgoes the opportunity to consume more
of each. The DM purchases the good only where it is cheapest, until switching to purchasing
the other good. With Partial-Narrow, the specialization is less extreme as the DM weighs
the effect of less consumption of the more expensive good in the subdecision as well as in
the decision overall.
B.2. Tests of NB-, BB-, and PNB- Sym. Symmetric preferences are natural in our
experimental setup, and in the decisions with equal prices, such as Decision 2, the majority
of subjects allocate evenly. By testing this property’s implications in other choices, we obtain
more powerful tests that do not rely on cross-decision comparisons. This power comes at the
cost of having to jointly test bracketing and the that underlying preferences are symmetric.
To the extent that these properties are compelling in our environment, the next set of tests
distinguish the three models of bracketing.
We thus test NB-Sym, BB-Sym, and PNB-Sym, using all of each condition’s implications
for a given decision. In Decision 1 tests, we find that 63% and 40% of subjects pass NB-Sym
in the Risk and Social Experiments respectively. These pass rates increase to 74% and 71%
if we allow for one error. We find quantitatively similar results for Decision 3. Pass rates
go down to 46% and 22% when we require a subject to pass NB-Sym in both Decisions 1
and 3 – but these numbers increase to 58% and 45% when we allow for one error across
both decisions. Thus most, but not all, subjects pass this test of the conjunction of narrow
bracketing with symmetric preferences.
Turning to tests of broad bracketing, 1% and 11% of subjects pass BB-Sym in the in
Decision 1 of the Risk, and Social Experiments respectively. Allowing for one error does
not increase pass rates at all, though one additional subject is within two errors of passing.
We obtain slightly higher pass rates (6% and 14%) in Decision 3. This discrepancy can be
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Risk Social
# errors 0 1 2 0 1 2
NB-Sym (D1) 62 73 84 41 72 82
NB-Sym (D3) 60 74 82 34 76 82
NB-Sym (both) 46 57 65 22 46 67
BB-Sym (D1) 1 1 1 11 11 12
BB-Sym (D3) 6 7 8 14 14 14
BB-Sym (both) 0 0 0 10 10 10
PNB-Sym (D1) 90 92 93 63 95 99
PNB-Sym (D3) 91 94 96 67 96 97
PNB-Sym (both) 86 88 92 46 77 93
# subjects 99 102
Entries count the # of subjects who pass each test at the listed error allowance.
Table 7. Tests of NB-, BB-, and PNB- Sym
traced to the relative strength of BB-Sym in these decisions. It makes a point prediction in
Decision 1 but allows two possible choices in Decision 3. No subjects pass BB-Sym in both
Decisions 1 and 3 for Risk, even when allowing for 2 errors.In Social, 10% of subjects pass,
which does not change when allowing for up to two errors. Thus these tests suggests that
only a small minority of subjects appear are close to consistent with broad bracketing.
Our PNB-Sym tests of partial-narrow bracketing have higher pass rates, as expected –
91% and 62% for Risk and Social Experiments respectively in Decision 1. Allowing one
error raises pass rates to include the vast majority of subjects – 93% and 93% respectively.
We obtain quantitatively similar results for Decision 3. However, allowing one error, only
18% and 12% pass PNB-Sym and neither of BB-Sym nor NB-Sym in Decision 1 in the two
experiments. We find that 87% and 45% pass PNB-Sym in both decisions, while 89% and
75% do so when allowing for one error. However, this means that, when allowing for one
error of tolerance, only 31% and 20% of subjects pass PNB-Sym in both Decision 1 and
3 who pass neither BB-Sym nor NB-Sym. Thus, partial-narrow bracketing only somewhat
helps to account for behavior in our experiments, in spite of the model’s relatively weak
implications in our experiment without parametric assumptions about utility.
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Table 8. Orders
Order Risk Social Shopping
(D1.1,D1.2), D2, (D3.1,D3.2), D4, D5 1M 14 24 15
(D1.2,D1.1), D2, (D3.1,D3.2), D4, D5 1L 16 14 15
(D1.1,D1.2), D2, (D3.2,D3.1), D4, D5 1H 19 15 17
(D3.2,D3.1), D2, (D1.1,D1.2), D4, D5 2X21 0 6 0
D4, (D3.2,D3.1), D2, (D1.2,D1.1), D5 2F 15 14 16
D4, (D3.1,D3.2), D2, (D1.2,D1.1), D5 2L 18 16 20
D4, (D3.2,D3.1), D2, (D1.1,D1.2), D5 2H 17 13 18
Total 99 102 101
Result 6. When allowing for one error in the Risk and Social Experiments, 58% and 45% of
subjects pass NB-Sym and 0% and 10% pass BB-Sym; only 31% and 20%% pass PNB-Sym
but not NB- nor BB- Sym.
Appendix C. Additional Details of the Experiments
We provide a list of the different orders, instructions and quizzes for all experiments,
sample decision sheets for each, and the payoff table for the Shopping Experiment. An
experimental round of choices was always staples together with the cover sheet on the first
page.
21Note that order 2X was unintended: it was printed, and run, due to a copy-and-paste error. However, we
saw no reason to exclude it from our analysis.
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Figure 2. Risk: Instructions
Investment task 
There will be five rounds of the investment task.  The first page of each round will announce the number of 
accounts in that round.  At the end of each round, raise your hand so that the experimenter can collect your 
decisions and give you the decision sheet for the next round.  At the end of all rounds, one round will be 
randomly selected to be the “round that counts”.  You will be paid your earnings from the round that counts 
based on (and only based on) your decisions in that round.  Since any round could be the round that counts, you 
should behave in each round as if it is the round that counts. 
In each round of this task, you will buy risky investments in up to two different “investment accounts”.  Each 
investment generates a return that depends on a roll of a six-sided dice.  You have a separate budget for each 
account that can be spent only in that account.  The dice will be rolled once, and you receive the returns from all 
your investments in all accounts in that round. 
 
Example 
As an example, suppose that in the round-that-counts you have two accounts. 
You have 20 ECU in Account 1, which has two investments available; each investment costs 1 ECU per unit. 
One unit in Asset A pays 
$0.40 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$0.10 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
One unit in Asset B pays 
$0.25 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$0.25 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
 
You have 15 ECU in Account 2, which has two investments available; each investment costs 1 ECU per unit. 
One unit in Asset C pays 
$0.60 if the dice roll is 1 or 2; 
$0.00 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
One unit in Asset D pays 
$0.30 if the dice roll is 1 or 2; 
$0.30 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
Suppose that  
In Account 1: you allocate 5 ECU to Asset A and 15 ECU to Asset B; 
In Account 2: you allocate 8 ECU to Asset C and 7 ECU to Asset D. 
Then, if the dice roll is 2, you will be paid: 
5 × $0.40 + 15 × $0.25 + 8 × $0.60 + 7 × $0.30 = $12.65. 
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Figure 3. Risk: Quiz
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand after you have done so. 
 
Question. 
Suppose that a round has two accounts.  Do your purchases in Account 1 affect what items you can afford to purchase in 
Account 2? 
 
YES / NO (highlight one) 
 
 
Question. 
Suppose that in a round of the experiment has two accounts.  Account 1 has two assets available, A and B.  Account 2 
has two different assets available, C and D. 
Each unit of Asset A pays $0.50 if the dice roll is 1 or 2 and $1.00 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6; 
Each unit of Asset B pays $1.00 if the dice roll is 1 or 2 and $0.50 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
Each unit of Asset C pays $0.50 if the dice roll is 1 or 2 and $0.00 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6; 
Each unit of Asset D pays $0.00 if the dice roll 1 or 2 and $1.00 if the dice roll is 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
 
Suppose that you invest as follows: 
in Account 1, you invest 2 ECU in Asset A and 6 ECU in Asset B; 
in Account 2, you invest 4 ECU in Asset C and 2 ECU in Asset D. 
 
1. If this round determines your payment, then how much will you earn if the dice roll is 2? 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
2. If this round determines your payment, then how much will you earn if the dice roll is 6? 
 
___________________________ 
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Figure 4. Risk: Cover Sheet for Round 1 (order 1M)
Subject #  Session  
Round 1 
In round 1, you have 2 investment accounts. 
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Figure 5. Risk: D1.1 Decision Sheet
Investment Account 1 
 
You have 10 ECU available in Account 1.  Two assets are available for purchase, Asset A and Asset B. 
The price of Asset A is 1 ECU per unit. 
The price of Asset B is 1 ECU per unit. 
 
One unit in Asset A pays 
$1.00 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$0.00 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
One unit in Asset B pays 
$0.00 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$1.20 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
 
 
Please highlight a feasible combination of purchases of Asset A and Asset B from the list below. 
 
0 units of Asset A and 10 units of Asset B. 
1 unit of Asset A and 9 units of Asset B. 
2 units of Asset A and 8 units of Asset B. 
3 units of Asset A and 7 units of Asset B. 
4 units of Asset A and 6 units of Asset B. 
5 units of Asset A and 5 units of Asset B. 
6 units of Asset A and 4 units of Asset B. 
7 units of Asset A and 3 units of Asset B. 
8 units of Asset A and 2 units of Asset B. 
9 units of Asset A and 1 unit of Asset B. 
10 units of Asset A and 0 units of Asset B.  
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Figure 6. Risk: D1.1 Decision Sheet
Investment Account 2 
 
You have 16 ECU available in Account 2.  Two assets are available for purchase, Asset C and Asset D. 
The price of Asset C is 1 ECU per unit. 
The price of Asset D is 1 ECU per unit. 
 
One unit in Asset C pays 
$1.00 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$0.00 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
One unit in Asset D pays 
$0.00 if the dice roll is 1, 2, or 3; 
$1.00 if the dice roll is 4, 5, or 6. 
 
Please highlight a feasible combination of purchases of Asset C and Asset D from the list below. 
0 units of Asset C and 16 units of Asset D. 
1 unit of Asset C and 15 units of Asset D. 
2 units of Asset C and 14 units of Asset D. 
3 units of Asset C and 13 units of Asset D. 
4 units of Asset C and 12 units of Asset D. 
5 units of Asset C and 11 units of Asset D. 
6 units of Asset C and 10 units of Asset D. 
7 units of Asset C and 9 units of Asset D. 
8 units of Asset C and 8 units of Asset D. 
9 units of Asset C and 7 units of Asset D. 
10 units of Asset C and 6 units of Asset D. 
11 units of Asset C and 5 units of Asset D. 
12 units of Asset C and 4 units of Asset D. 
13 units of Asset C and 3 units of Asset D. 
14 units of Asset C and 2 units of Asset D. 
15 units of Asset C and 1 unit of Asset D. 
16 units of Asset C and 0 units of Asset D. 
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Figure 7. Social: Instructions
Division task 
There will be five rounds of a task where you will asked to allocate tokens between two other participants who 
will herein be labelled “person A” and “person B”.  They will not be told your identity, and you will not be told 
their identities.  That is, you will remain completely anonymous to each other. 
In each round of this task, you will have tokens in up to two different accounts.  You decide how to allocate 
tokens between person A and person B in each account.  The value per token allocated to each of A and B may 
vary across rounds and across accounts.  You have a separate budget of tokens for each account that can be 
allocated only in that account.  Payments for a given round will be determined by the sum of the value of all 
tokens allocated in all accounts in that round. 
The first page of each round will announce the number of accounts in that round.  At the end of each round, 
raise your hand so that the experimenter can collect your decisions and give you the decision sheet for the next 
round. 
You and every other participant has numbered a sealed envelope at the beginning of the experiment.  Each 
participant has been randomly allocated to a group and role (A or B); this is recorded in the envelope.  The 
round that counts to determine your payment has also been randomly selected and recorded in each envelope.  
Your group has been randomly and anonymously matched to determine the payment of another group and one 
round of your choices will determine the earnings of person A and person B in that group.  Since each round 
could be the round that counts and actually determines a two other subjects’ payments, you should treat each 
round as if it is the round that counts. 
 
Example 
As an example, suppose that in the round-that-counts there are two accounts. 
There are 10 tokens in Account 1. 
One token is worth $0.80 to A and $0.60 to B. 
 
There are 12 tokens in Account 2. 
One token pays $1.00 to A and $0.20 to B. 
 
Suppose that 
In Account 1: you allocate 4 tokens to A and 6 tokens to B. 
In Account 2: you allocate 2 tokens to A and 10 tokens to B. 
Then, 
A’s earnings are 4 × $0.80 + 2 × $1.00 = $5.20; 
B’s earnings are 6 × $0.60 + 10 × $0.20 = $5.60. 
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Figure 8. Social: Quiz
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand after you have done so. 
 
Question. 
Suppose that a round has two accounts.  Does your allocation in Account 1 affect what you have available to allocate in 
Account 2? 
 
YES / NO (highlight one) 
 
 
Question. 
Suppose that a round of the experiment has two accounts. 
In Account 1, each token pays $0.40 to A and $0.60 to B. 
In Account 2, each token pays $0.30 to A and $0.40 to B. 
 
Suppose that you invest as follows: 
in Account 1, you allocate 2 tokens to A and 4 tokens to B; 
in Account 2, you allocate 6 tokens to A and 1 token to B. 
 
1. If this is the round that counts for this group, then how much will person A receive? 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
2. If this is the round that counts for this group, then how much will person B receive? 
 
___________________________ 
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Figure 9. Social: D5 Decision Sheet
Account 1 
 
You have 10 tokens available in Account 1. 
Each token allocated to A is worth $1.00. 
Each token allocated to B is worth $1.20. 
 
 
Please highlight a feasible allocation of tokens between A and B. 
 
0 tokens for A and 10 tokens for B. 
1 token for A and 9 tokens for B. 
2 tokens for A and 8 tokens for B. 
3 tokens for A and 7 tokens for B. 
4 tokens for A and 6 tokens for B. 
5 tokens for A and 5 tokens for B. 
6 tokens for A and 4 tokens for B. 
7 tokens for A and 3 tokens for B. 
8 tokens for A and 2 tokens for B. 
9 tokens for A and 1 token for B. 
10 tokens for A and 0 tokens for B. 
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Figure 10. Shopping: Instructions
Shopping Task 
There will be five rounds of the shopping task.  At the end of all rounds of the experiment, one round will be 
randomly selected to be the “round that counts”.  You will be paid your earnings from the round that counts 
based on (and only based on) your decisions in that round.  Since any round could be the round that counts, you 
should behave in each round as if it is the round that counts. 
In each round of this task, you will buy up to two different fictitious “fruits” at up to two “stores”.  You have a 
separate gift certificate (denominated in experimental currency units – ECUs) at each store that can be spent 
only at that store.  However, your monetary earnings for the experiment are based on the total amount of each 
fruit in your final bundle for a round after you have completed your shopping at all stores. 
The first page of each round will announce the number of stores in that round.  At the end of each round, raise 
your hand so that the experimenter can collect your decisions and give you the decision sheet for the next round. 
 
How Your Payment is Determined 
Your monetary payment will be calculated from your final bundle in the round that counts according to the 
function 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
2
5
(√#𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 + √#𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠)
2
. 
To help you calculate the payment you would receive for a final bundle, we have provided tables at the end of 
the experiment that indicates the payment that would result from all possible final bundles (and some 
impossible ones). 
 
As an example of how your payment will be calculated, suppose you buy: 
1 apple and 5 oranges at Store 1, 
2 apples and 6 oranges at Store 2. 
Then your final bundle is  
3 apples and 11 oranges. 
To calculate your payment locate the entry in the “3 apples” column and the “11 oranges” row of the payment 
table. 
Notice three features of the payment table: 
(i) A final bundle with more of every fruit earns a higher payment. 
(ii) A mix of fruits earns a higher payment: a final bundle with 5 apples and 5 oranges earns you a 
higher payment than a final bundle with 8 apples and 2 oranges, which in turn earns a higher 
payment than a final bundle with 10 apples and 0 oranges. 
(iii) A final bundle with 7 apples and 3 oranges earns the same final payment as a final bundle with 3 
apples and 7 oranges. 
If the prices of apples and oranges are not the same, you thus face a trade-off between buying as many units 
of fruit as possible versus buying a mix that includes both fruits. 
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Figure 11. Shopping: Quiz
 
How to Shop in each Store 
You will have a separate gift certificate at each store denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs).  
The page for each store will present you with the prices of the fruits in that store.  You must highlight one of the 
feasible apple-orange-watermelon combinations at each store to spend your gift certificate.  Feasible 
combinations will be denoted in a list.  If that combination does not appear in the, then it is not affordable with 
your gift certificate at that store. 
 
To illustrate how you make your decision in each store, consider the following hypothetical store; you have a 6 
ECU gift certificate for this store, and apples and oranges each cost 1 ECU per unit of fruit.  Then your store 
page will be laid out as follows. 
 
Store     
You have a 6 ECU gift certificate to spend. 
The price of apples is 1 ECU per apple. 
The price of oranges is 1 ECU per orange. 
 
Please highlight a feasible combination of apples and oranges from the list below to make your purchase from 
this store. 
0 apples and 6 oranges. 
1 apple and 5 oranges. 
2 apples and 4 oranges. 
3 apples and 3 oranges. 
4 apples and 2 oranges. 
5 apples and 1 orange. 
6 apples and 0 oranges. 
 
Question 1. 
How much would you earn if a round with only the store above was the round that counts, and you had chosen 
the bundle you indicated above? 
 
Question 2. 
Suppose that the round that counts had two stores.  In Store 1, you bought 1 apple and 4 oranges.  In store 2, 
you bought 3 apples and 5 oranges. What would your earnings be for the experiment? 
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Figure 12. Shopping: D3.2 Decision Sheet
Store 2
You have a 24 ECU gift certificate at Store 2. 
The price of apples is 3 ECU per apple. 
The price of oranges is 2 ECU per orange. 
 
Please highlight a feasible combination of apples and oranges from the list below to make your purchase from 
this store. 
 
0 apples and 12 oranges. 
0 apples and 11 oranges. 
1 apple and 10 oranges. 
2 apples and 9 oranges. 
2 apples and 8 oranges. 
3 apples and 7 oranges. 
4 apples and 6 oranges. 
4 apples and 5 oranges. 
5 apples and 4 oranges. 
6 apples and 3 oranges. 
6 apples and 2 oranges. 
7 apples and 1 orange. 
8 apples and 0 oranges. 
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Figure 13. Shopping Payoff Table
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